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ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Appellant Kilgore Pavement Maintenance, LLC ("KPM"), by and through its 
undersigned counsel Strong & Hanni law firm, respectfully requests oral argument. The 
district court, in dismissing KPM's first cause of action, erroneously determined that 
KPM assumed the risk of a commercially impracticability pursuant to its contract with 
the City of West Jordan ("West Jordan"). Oral argument may assist the Court in its 
consideration of this issue. 
2 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The caption of this case contains the names of all parties to the proceeding in the 
Third District Judicial Court, Salt Lake County, for the State of Utah. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
In dismissing KPM's first cause of action, the district court had jurisdiction to hear 
its claims against West Jordan under Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-501. Final judgment of 
dismissal was entered for the West Jordan on January 12, 2010, and KPM timely filed its 
notice of appeal on February 3, 2010. This Court has jurisdiction to hear KPM's appeal 
under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-3-102(3) and 78A-3-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
This is an appeal by KPM from a dismissal under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6) and final judgment in a civil action alleging commercial impracticability and 
practical impossibility. In 2008, KPM entered into a contract (the "Contract") with West 
Jordan to provide asphalt services, labor and materials for the completion of the 9000 
South Road Reconstruction Project—Bangerter Highway to 4000 West (the "Project"). 
KPM's bid for the Project was based on the then-current liquid asphalt oil cost of 
$350/ton. Within a short period of time and based on unforeseen factors outside of 
KPM's control, the price for liquid asphalt oil increased 300% to $l,005/ton. The district 
court dismissed KPM's Complaint, and in particular its first cause of action, 
"Commercial Impracticability/Practical Impossibility," on the grounds that "pursuant to 
the contract, [KPM] assumed responsibility for supplying all materials necessary for their 
performance, and therefore assumed the risk of supply cost increases." (R. 244.) The 
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district court further ruled that while it noted the dramatic increase in cost of liquid 
asphalt oil after the Contract was entered, "a party who assumes the risk of cost increases 
pursuant to contract terms cannot rely on a claim of impossibility/commercial 
impracticability." (R. 244.) 
The issues thus presented to this Court are: 
1. Did the district court err in determining that f 1PM assumed the risk of an 
unforeseen and extraordinary increase in the cost of liquid asphalt oil pursuant to the 
parties' contract? Preserved at the Hearing regarding West Jordan's Motion for 
Reconsideration. (R. 261.) 
2. Did the district court err in dismissing KPM's first cause of action because 
of its determination that "a party who assumes the risk of cost increases pursuant to 
contract terms cannot rely on a claim of impossibility/impracticability"? (R. 244.) This 
issue was preserved at the Hearing regarding West Jordan's Motion for Reconsideration. 
(R.261.) 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 (adopted by Western Prop. v. Southern 
Utah Aviation, Inc. 776 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1989)):: 
Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made 
impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-
occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was 
made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the 
language or the circumstances indicate the contrary. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6): 
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(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, 
except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made 
by motion: . . . (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
KPM's Complaint alleges that a dramatic and unforseen escalation of liquid 
asphalt oil prices in 2008 after execution of the Contract with West Jordan caused KPM 
to suffer an unreasonable and excessive cost to complete the Project. (R. 1-3.) The 
Complaint also alleges that this escalation of asphalt oil prices was not addressed in the 
Contract, rendered performance of the Project impracticable, and that to hold KPM to the 
contract price would be unjust and cause an extreme, commercially unacceptable and 
unreasonable expense to KPM far beyond what was contemplated in the Project. (R. 3-
4.) 
The district court denied and then granted on reconsideration West Jordan's 
motion to dismiss based on its above-stated conclusion that KPM assumed any and all 
risks associated with the Project, and therefore could not rely on a commercial 
impracticability/commercial impossibility claim. (R. 245-247.) 
B. Facts. 
The following facts are drawn from KPM's Complaint and should be accepted as 
true for purpose of this appeal according to the Standard of Review described below: 
On July 1, 2008, KPM submitted a bid to West Jordan to provide asphalt services, 
labor and materials for the Project. (R. 2.) KPM was awarded the job and entered into 
8 
the Contract with West Jordan on July 22, 2008. (R. 2.) The bid for the Project 
submitted by KPM was calculated based on the then-current liquid asphalt oil cost of 
$350/ton. (R. 2.) Within a very short period of time, this cost increased threefold to 
$l,005/ton. (R. 2.) This occurred because of an unprecedented and unforeseen 
escalation in crude oil prices which coincided with a severe shortage of liquid asphalt oil 
in the summer of 2008. (R. 2-3.) 
On August 12, 2008, the Utah Chapter of the Associated General Contractors (the 
"AGC") issued a Whitepaper stating that the instability of the crude oil prices and limited 
supply and shortage of asphalt had dramatically driven up the price of liquid asphalt. (R. 
2, 32.) The AGC encouraged state entities to include asphalt price escalation clauses in 
their hot-mix asphalt contracts and not to compel contractors to predict future costs of 
liquid asphalt. (R. 3, 32.) The AGC further emphasized that "the current economic 
climate makes such costs extremely difficult to predict, and injecting such a large 
measure of uncertainty in the bidding process would introduce gross and potentially 
costly inefficiencies to procurement of necessary work." (R. 3, 32.) 
The Contract, written and prepared by West Jordan just prior to the AGC 
Whitepaper, did not contain an asphalt escalation clause. (R.. 3.) Further, the risk of the 
unexpected escalation of asphalt oil prices was not specifically contemplated anywhere in 
the Contract. (R. 3.) Instead, Section 11.1 of the Contract addresses the potential for 
changes in the Contract price. Specifically, it states: 
c. The value of any Work covered by a Change Order or Work Directive 
Change or of any claim for an increase or decrease in the Contract Price 
shall be determined in one of the following ways: 
9 
3. On the basis of the Cost of the Work . . . plus the Contractor's Fee for 
overhead and profit. 
(R. 51.) Cost of the Work as referenced in above Article 11.1(c)(3) is defined as "the 
sum of all costs necessarily incurred and paid for by the Contractor for labor, materials, 
and equipment in the proper performance of the Work, plus the Contractor's fee for 
overhead and profit." (R. 35.) 
Subsequent to executing the Contract and the unexpected increase in cost of liquid 
asphalt oil, KPM submitted a request to West Jordan's Engineering Department on 
August 22, 2008, for a price increase of $91,000.00. (R. 3.) Although the City Manager 
presented an amendment to the Contract for approval of this price adjustment, the West 
Jordan City Counsel voted against the proposed amendment and denied KPM's request 
for price adjustment. (R. 3.) 
C. Proceedings in the District Court. 
On January 30, 2009, KPM filed an action against West Jordan in the Third 
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, alleging commercial 
impracticability, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (R. 1.) The Complaint alleges that the rapid and 
unexpected increase in liquid asphalt oil after execution of the Contract rendered KPM's 
completion of the Project at the contract price impracticable, or alternatively, West 
Jordan breached its obligations to KPM by refusing to grant a change order and 
reimburse KPM the increased cost of materials. (R. 1-8.) 
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West Jordan moved to dismiss the Complaint under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (R. 82-84.) West 
Jordan argued that all of KPM's claims should be dismissed because (1) West Jordan did 
not breach the Contract with KPM because it completed its final payment in accordance 
with the Contract terms; (2) it did not breach the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
by refusing to authorize a Change Order for the increased cost; (3) West Jordan was not 
unjustly enriched because each party received what it bargained for; and (4) KPM 
assumed the risk of increased cost in the Contract, completed the Project, and thus there 
was no claim for commercial impracticability/practical impossibility. (R. 164-184.) 
Accordingly, West Jordan argued, KPM was not entitled to $91,000.00 for increased 
costs. (R. 164-184.) 
On June 30, 2009, the Honorable Judge Sandra Peuler heard oral arguments on 
West Jordan's Motion to Dismiss. (R. 194.) The district court subsequently dismissed all 
claims except KPM's first cause of action, "Commercial Impracticability/Practical 
Impossibility." (R. 194.) West Jordan then moved the district court to reconsider its 
ruling allowing KPM to proceed on its surviving first cause of action. (R. 204-206.) 
Acting on West Jordan's Motion to Reconsider, the district court dismissed KPM's 
commercial impracticability claim on January 12, 2010. (R. 245-247.) KPM appealed 
the ruling to this Court on February 3, 2010. (R. 248-253.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
KPM did not contract to assume any and all risks associated with its completion of 
the Project and, therefore, the unforeseen 300% increase in cost of liquid asphalt oil 
experienced after execution of the Contract allows KPM to make a claim against West 
Jordan for commercial impracticability. Although a party may "agree to perform in spite 
of impracticability/' in the absence of express language, the potential foreseeability of a 
particular event does not necessarily imply the assumption of this "greater obligation." 
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 (1981), cmt. c. West Jordan has argued, 
and the district court has apparently concurred, that KPM contractually assumed all risks 
associated with the cost of materials, including those risks that would normally excuse 
KPM's performance under the doctrine of impracticability. (R. 207-218.) In other 
words, the district court has decided that because KPM agreed to furnish materials at its 
expense, it can never assert a claim for commercial impracticability, regardless of any 
unforeseen increase in cost, no matter how abrupt, and no matter how extraordinary or 
excessive. (R. 242.) 
The district court erred in dismissing KPM's commercial impracticability claim 
for two reasons. First, the Contract does not explicitly the assign risk of any and all cost 
increases to KPM. The "four corners" of the Contract do not contain an absolute ceiling 
on the "Contract Price" or "Cost of Work" to West Jordan, nor does the Contract include 
any other written provision which conclusively evinces the parties' intent to allocate the 
risk of impracticability solely to KPM. (R. 28-30; 34-73.) Based on common law 
principles of contractual interpretation, before the district court dismissed KPM's claim, 
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it should have considered facts relating to the relative increase in cost to KPM and the 
attending circumstances of the parties (for example, the bargaining power of the City and 
the inability of KPM to negotiate an asphalt price escalation clause1) and determined 
whether the impracticability was actually foreseen and exclusively assumed by KPM. 
See Western Prop, v. Southern Utah Aviation, Inc, 776 P.2d 656, 659 n. 5 (Utah App. 
1989) (noting that the "critical fact" is "whether the parties actually did foresee [the 
event] and provide accordingly in their contract" (emphasis in original text)); Raytheon 
Co, v. Sec, of the Army, 305 F.3d 1354, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("Whether performance of 
a particular contract would be commercially senseless is a question of fact."). 
Second, the district court incorrectly interpreted the Contract's terms to foreclose 
KPM's claim of an increase in the contract price for impracticability. Contrary to West 
Jordan's arguments and the district court's determination, the Contract contemplates the 
potential for change in the contract price, including in this case, an increase for 
commercial impracticability. In addition to "Work covered by [a City-approved] Change 
Order," Section 11.1(c) of the Contract provides a specific formula for determining "[t]he 
value of . . . any claim for an increase or decrease in the Contract Price" that would 
include KPM's claim. (R. 51) (emphasis added) (determining the "Cost of Work" 
pursuant to sections 11.2 and 11.4). The rule of impracticability and this provision in the 
1
 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261, cmt. c (stating that "[circumstances 
relevant in deciding whether a party has assumed a greater obligation include his ability 
to have inserted a provision in the contract expressly shifting the risk of impracticability 
to the other party"). As argued before the district court, the Contract prepared and 
mandated by West Jordan did not allow KPM to propose or even suggest an asphalt price 
escalation clause to mitigate the risk of impracticability. (R. 227.) 
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Contract provide a necessary mechanism for adjusting the contract price to compensate 
KPM for the extraordinary and unforeseen change of circumstances it experienced only a 
few short weeks after the Contract was executed. 
Based on the facts as alleged in KPM's Complaint, and which must be accepted by 
this Court as true (infra), the subsequent 300% price escalation of liquid asphalt oil (the 
raw material required to perform the Contract) was materially excessive, abrupt, and 
unforeseen, thereby causing KPM to suffer an unreasonable and excessive cost increase, 
rendering KPM's performance on the Project impracticable and warranting its claim for 
relief. (R. 3.) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 
The grant of a motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo. Miller v. State, 226 P.3d 
743, 746 (Utah App. 2010). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only 
if it appears the plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under the facts alleged or under 
any state of facts the plaintiffs could prove to support the plaintiffs' claims. Mackey v. 
Cannon, 996 P.2d 1081, 1084 (Utah App. 2000); Wells v. WalkerBank & Trust Co., Inc., 
590 P.2d 1261, 1263 (Utah 1979). When reviewing whether a district court has properly 
granted a motion to dismiss under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the appellate court accepts 
the factual allegations in KPM's Complaint as true and considers them and all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Canyon 
Meadows Home Owners Assn. v. Wasatch County, 40 P.3d 1148, 1151 (Utah App. 2001). 
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B, Contract Interpretation 
A contract's interpretation may be either a question of law, determined by the 
words of the agreement, or a question of fact, determined by extrinsic evidence of intent. 
Hoggan v. Hoggan, 169 P.3d 750, 751-52 (Utah 2007) (quoting Kimball v. Campbell 
699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1986)). So long as a court confines its analysis to the language 
of the contract and does not resort to extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent, 
interpretation of the contract is an issue of law and no deference is ceded to the district 
court's conclusion, which is reviewed for correctness. Id.; Canyon Meadows, 40 P.3d 
1151-51. 
C. Commercial Impracticability 
Whether a contract is impracticable is a question of law reviewed de novo. 
Central Kan. Credit Union v. Mutual Guar. Corp., 102 F.3d 1097, 1102 (10th Cir. 1996). 
"The district court's determination that a plaintiffs complaint 'fail[s] to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted,' leading the court to grant the defendant's motion to 
dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is a legal conclusion 
that [is] reviewed for correctness." Summit Water Distrib. Co. v. Summit County, 123 
P.3d 437, 441 (Utah 2005). The district court's decision is afforded no deference. 
Williams v. Bench, 193 P.3d 640, 645 (Utah App. 2008). 
ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court Erred in Dismissing KPM's Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) 
Utah adopts the common law rule of impracticability that a contractual obligation 
"is deemed discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and 
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without fault of the obligated party, which event makes performance of the obligation 
impossible or highly impracticable." Western Prop., 776 P.2d at 658 (citing Holmgren v. 
Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 582 P.2d 856, 861 (Utah 1978) and Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 261). Although this rule is usually phrased in terms of impossibility of 
performance, it can also apply in circumstances beyond absolute impossibility. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261, cmt. d. For example, "an unforeseen shutdown 
of major sources of supply, or the like," which "causes a marked increase in cost" may 
render contractual performance impracticable. Id. The rule is based, in part, on a 
principle of "basic equity" {Western Prop., 776 P.2d at 658) such that unforeseen 
increased costs "beyond the normal range," even in a fixed-price contract, can invoke 
application. Id. 
Also, courts have recognized that the rule of impracticability may apply in broader 
circumstances beyond excusing performance. See Corbin on Contracts § 74.15 (2009) 
("Like the common law in general, the impossibility doctrine is sufficiently flexible and 
adaptive to achieve just results dependent on the factual circumstances presented to the 
court."); see also, generally, Bitzes v. Sunset Oaks, Inc., 649 P.2d 66, 68 (Utah 1982) 
(stating that a liberal application of the doctrine of impossibility has been applied by the 
courts in recent years). In government contracting for example, a commercially 
impracticable contract can entitle a contractor to an equitable adjustment in price to 
Specifically, comment d to the Restatement provides: "A mere change in the degree of 
difficulty or expense due to such causes as increased wages, prices of raw materials, or 
costs of construction, unless well beyond the normal range, does not amount to 
impracticability since it is the sort of risk that a fixed-price contract is intended to cover." 
(Emphasis added). 
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compensate for the constructive change imposed by an unforeseen event. Raytheon, 305 
F.3d 1354, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Some states provide for equitable adjustments in 
public contracts even without reference to a specific clause in the given contract. See 
M.J. Paquet, Inc. v. N.J. Dept. of Tramp., 794 A.2d 141, 149-50 (N.J. 2002). Although it 
appears that Utah has yet to address this issue directly. 
As discussed below, the district court erred in dismissing KPM's claim because 
KPM did not assume the risk of any and all price increases and the Contract allows for a 
price adjustment based on KPM's impracticability claim. 
A. The District Court Erred in Determining that KPM Assumed the Risk of a 
Commercial Impracticability. 
The district court determined that KPM expressly assumed the risk of 
impracticability under the Contract; namely, the extraordinary and unforeseen increase in 
cost of liquid asphalt oil that KPM realized shortly thereafter. (R. 242-244.) To find one 
side has assumed the risk of impracticability, the court must determine whether that risk 
was explicitly contracted for by the parties. See Corbin on Contracts § 74.15 (2009). 
Importantly, the principal factor for a determination of impracticability is actual 
foreseeability. Western Prop., 776 P.2d at 659 n. 5. Because the rule is also based on the 
principle of assent, "the critical fact is not whether the event could have been foreseen, 
but rather, whether the parties actually did foresee it and provide accordingly in their 
3
 Although this case does not find the doctrine of impracticability applicable, it 
recognizes that "[i]n government contracting, impracticability has also been treated as a 
type of constructive change to the contract; because a commercially impracticable 
contract imposes substantial unforeseen costs on the contractor, the contract is entitled to 
an equitable adjustment." 
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contract." Id. (emphasis in original). Most contracts (including the one at issue) do not 
explicitly allocate the burden of a specific risk and, more often, a court must examine the 
entire contract and other circumstances affecting the agreement to make such a 
determination. Corbin on Contracts § 74.15. 
In this case, the district court determined that commercial impracticability, caused 
by the dramatic increase in the cost of liquid asphalt oil, was—notwithstanding the 
allegations in KPM's Complaint—foreseen by the parties and exclusively assumed by 
KPM. (R. 242-244.) However, no terms of the Contract expressly allocate this risk to 
KPM. Only section 11.1(a) of the Contract speaks of the parties' "Contract Price," which 
does not mandate an absolute ceiling, but contemplates claims for an "increase or 
decrease" under Section 11.1(c). The various responsibilities of KPM argued by West 
Jordan for its "Work" on the Project under sections 6.2(d) and 9.9(c) of the Contract 
relate to indemnification of the City (§ 6.11), KPM's means and methods of construction 
(§ 9(c)-(d)), warranty (§ 13.1), and the like. Significantly, the "Work" of KPM 
referenced in these sections is distinguished from the "Cost of Work" defined in Article I 
and invoked in Section 11.2. As such, under the terms of the Contract and as alleged in 
the Complaint, KPM did not foresee and did not contract for the risk of an impracticable 
increase in material supplies. 
In deciding West Jordan's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the district court 
should have considered fact questions regarding impracticability and the actual 
forseeability of the same KPM's favor and not ruled that an assumption of risk of normal 
unextraordinary cost increases necessarily forecloses any claim of impracticability. (R. 
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245-247.)4 Absent a specific provision within the Contract evincing the parties5 intent 
that the risk of a commercial impracticability would be solely borne by KPM, KPM's 
claim does not fail and should not have been dismissed. The district court erroneously 
concluded that KPM assumed the risk of impracticability without considering the intent 
of the parties in contracting (or not) for an unforeseen increase in the price of materials, 
well beyond the normal range of contract expectation. See Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 261, cmt. c and d. 
B. The District Court Further Erred in Determining that KPM Could Not 
Rely on a Claim of Impracticability Pursuant to the Terms of the Contract 
to Increase the Contract Price. 
The district also erred in accepting West Jordan's argument that the Contract's 
terms foreclose KPM's request for an increase in price. Examining the terms of the 
Contract, it is clear that it does not provide an absolute ceiling on the contract price, and 
in fact, addresses a procedure for change to the contract price. (R. 51.) Section 11.1(a) 
states that "[t]he Contract Price constitutes the total compensation (subject to City-
authorized adjustments [under section 11.1(b)])" payable to KPM and that "[a]ll duties, 
responsibilities, and obligations assigned to or undertaken by [KPM] shall be at its 
expense without change in the Contract Price." (R. 51.) However, the Contract also 
provides a formula for adjustment of the Contract Price outside of City-approved change 
orders. (R. 51) (stating that "[t]he value of any Work covered by a Change Order or 
4
 The district court's determination in this regard is as follows: "While it is true that the 
cost of asphalt oil increased dramatically after the contract was entered into, a party who 
assumes the risk of cost increases pursuant to contract terms cannot rely on a claim of 
impossibility/commercial impracticability." (R. 242) (emphasis added). 
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Dated this ^ day of August, 2010. 
STRONG & HANNI 
Gradefrftl JacRsoh 
William B. Ingram 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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Work Directive Change or of any claim for an increase or decrease in the Contract Price 
shall be determined in one of the following ways . . . ." (emphasis added)). Of course, if 
only West Jordan-authorized adjustments could increase the Contract Price, there would 
be no need for the additional language of section 11.1(c) for any other "claim." See 
Jones v. ERA Brokers ConsoL, 6 P.3d 1129, 1131 (Utah 2000) (stating that contract 
provisions should be interpreted by a court "in relation to all of the others, with a view 
toward giving effect to all and ignoring none"). The Contract does not impose an 
absolute ceiling on the Contract Price but contemplates changes, both for City-authorized 
adjustments and other claims, including KPM's claim for commercial impracticability. 
Contract at § 11.1(c). As such, under the rule of commercial impracticability and the 
language of the Contract itself, KPM has a claim to increase the contract price pursuant to 
its first cause of action. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, KPM respectfully requests the Court reverse the district 
court's dismissal and reinstate KPM's first cause of action. Because the parties did not 
expressly allocate the risk of a commercial impracticability in the Contract, there are 
substantial questions that should have precluded the district court's order, specifically 
relating to KPM's assumption of the risk and the Contract's provision for price 
adjustment based on KPM's claim Furthermore, the decision of the district court to 
dismiss despite the pleadings and the non-explicit terms of the Contract is erroneous. 
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ADDENDUM 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 261 
§ 261 Discharge by Supervening Impracticability 
Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable 
without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a 
basic assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to render that 
performance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the 
contrary. 
COMMENTS & ILLUSTRATIONS: Comment: 
a. Scope: Even though a party, in assuming a duty, has not qualified the language of his 
undertaking, a court may relieve him of that duty if performance has unexpectedly 
become impracticable as a result of a supervening event (see Introductory Note to this 
Chapter). This Section states the general principle under which a party's duty may be so 
discharged. The following three sections deal with the three categories of cases where 
this general principle has traditionally been applied: supervening death or incapacity of a 
person necessary for performance (§ 262), supervening destruction of a specific thing 
necessary for performance (§ 263), and supervening prohibition or prevention by law (§ 
264). But, like Uniform Commercial Code § 2-615(a), this Section states a principle 
broadly applicable to all types of impracticability and it "deliberately refrains from any 
effort at an exhaustive expression of contingencies" (Comment 2 to Uniform Commercial 
Code § 2-615). The principle, like others in this Chapter, yields to a contrary agreement 
by which a party may assume a greater as well as a lesser obligation. By such an 
agreement, for example, a party may undertake to achieve a result irrespective of 
supervening events that may render its achievement impossible, and if he does so his 
non-performance is a breach even if it is caused by such an event. See Comment c. The 
rule stated in this Section applies only to discharge a duty to render a performance and 
does not affect a claim for breach that has already arisen. The effect of events subsequent 
to a breach on the amount of damages recoverable is governed by the rules on remedies 
stated in Chapter 16. See Comment e to § 347. Their effect on a claim for breach by 
anticipatory repudiation is governed by the rules on discharge stated in Chapter 12. Cases 
of existing, as opposed to supervening, impracticability are governed by § 266 rather than 
this Section. 
b. Basic assumption. In order for a supervening event to discharge a duty under this 
Section, the non-occurrence of that event must have been a "basic assumption" on which 
both parties made the contract (see Introductory Note to this Chapter). This is the 
criterion used by Uniform Commercial Code § 2-615(a). Its application is simple enough 
in the cases of the death of a person or destruction of a specific thing necessary for 
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performance. The continued existence of the person or thing (the non-occurrence of the 
death of destruction) is ordinarily a basic assumption on which the contract was made, so 
that death or destruction effects a discharge. Its application is also simple enough in the 
cases of market shifts or the financial inability of one of the parties. The continuation of 
existing market conditions and of the financial situation of the parties are ordinarily not 
such assumptions, so that mere market shifts or financial inability do not usually effect 
discharge under the rule stated in this Section. In borderline cases this criterion is 
sufficiently flexible to take account of factors that bear on a just allocation of risk. The 
fact that the event was foreseeable, or even foreseen, does not necessarily compel a 
conclusion that its non-occurrence was not a basic assumption. See Comment c to this 
Section and Comment a to § 265. 
Illustrations: 
1. On June 1, A agrees to sell and B to buy goods to be delivered in October at a 
designated port. The port is subsequently closed by quarantine regulations during the 
entire month of October, no commercially reasonable substitute performance is available 
(see Uniform Commercial Code § 2-614(1)), and A fails to deliver the goods. A's duty to 
deliver the goods is discharged, and A is not liable to B for breach of contract. 
2. A contracts to produce a movie for B. As B knows, A's only source of funds is a $ 
100,000 deposit in C bank. C bank fails, and A does not produce the movie. A's duty to 
produce the movie is not discharged, and A is liable to B for breach of contract. 
3. A and B make a contract under which B is to work for A for two years at a salary of $ 
50,000 a year. At the end of one year, A discontinues his business because governmental 
regulations have made it unprofitable and fires B. A's duty to employ B is not discharged, 
and A is liable to B for breach of contract. 
4. A contracts to sell and B to buy a specific machine owned by A to be delivered on July 
30. On July 29, as a result of a creditor's suit against A, a receiver is appointed and takes 
charge of all of A's assets, and A does not deliver the goods on July 30. A's duty to 
deliver the goods is not discharged, and A is liable to B for breach of contract. 
c. Contrary indication. A party may, by appropriate language, agree to perform in spite 
of impracticability that would otherwise justify his non-performance under the rule stated 
in this Section. He can then be held liable for damages although he cannot perform. Even 
absent an express agreement, a court may decide, after considering all the circumstances, 
that a party impliedly assumed such a greater obligation. In this respect the rule stated in 
this Section parallels that of Uniform Commercial Code § 2-615, which applies "Except 
so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation . . . ." Circumstances relevant in 
deciding whether a party has assumed a greater obligation include his ability to have 
inserted a provision in the contract expressly shifting the risk of impracticability to the 
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other party. This will depend on the extent to which the agreement was standardized (cf. 
§ 211), the degree to which the other party supplied the terms (cf. § 206), and, in the case 
of a particular trade or other group, the frequency with which language so allocating the 
risk is used in that trade or group (cf. § 219). The fact that a supplier has not taken 
advantage of his opportunity expressly to shift therisk of a shortage in his supply by 
means of contract language may be regarded as more significant where he is middleman, 
with a variety of sources of supply and an opportunity to spread the risk among many 
customers on many transactions by slight adjustment of his prices, than where he is a 
producer with a limited source of supply, few outlets, and no comparable opportunity. A 
commercial practice under which a party might be expected to insure or otherwise secure 
himself against a risk also militates against shifting it to the other party. If the 
supervening event was not reasonably foreseeable when the contract was made, the party 
claiming discharge can hardly be expected to have provided against its occurrence. 
However, if it was reasonably foreseeable, or even foreseen, the opposite conclusion does 
not necessarily follow. Factors such as the practical difficulty of reaching agreement on 
the myriad of conceivable terms of a complex agreement may excuse a failure to deal 
with improbable contingencies. See Comment h to this Section and Comment a to § 265. 
Illustration: 
5. A, who has had many years of experience in the field of salvage, contracts to raise and 
float B's boat, which has run aground. The contract, prepared by A, contains no clause 
limiting Afs duty in the case of unfavorable weather, unforeseen circumstances, or 
otherwise. The boat then slips into deep water and fills with mud, making it impracticable 
for A to raise it. If the court concludes, on the basis of such circumstances as Afs 
experience and the absence of any limitation in the contract that A prepared, that A 
assumed an absolute duty, it will decide that A's duty to raise and float the boat is not 
discharged and that A is liable to B for breach of contract. 
d. Impracticability\ Events that come within the rule stated in this Section are generally 
due either to "acts of God" or to acts of third parties. If the event that prevents the 
obligor's performance is caused by the obligee, it will ordinarily amount to a breach by 
the latter and the situation will be governed by the rules stated in Chapter 10, without 
regard to this Section. See Illustrations 4-7 to § 237. If the event is due to the fault of the 
obligor himself, this Section does not apply. As used here "fault" may include not only 
"willful" wrongs, but such other types of conduct as that amounting to breach of contract 
or to negligence. See Comment 1 to Uniform Commercial Code § 2-613. Although the 
rule stated in this Section is sometimes phrased in terms of "impossibility," it has long 
been recognized that it may operate to discharge a party's duty even though the event has 
not made performance absolutely impossible. This Section, therefore, uses 
"impracticable," the term employed by Uniform Commercial Code § 2-615(a), to 
describe the required extent of the impediment to performance. Performance may be 
impracticable because extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury, or loss to one 
A-3 
of the parties will be involved. A severe shortage of raw materials or of supplies due to 
war, embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen shutdown of major sources of supply, or the 
like, which either causes a marked increase in cost or prevents performance altogether 
may bring the case within the rule stated in this Section. Performance may also be 
impracticable because it will involve a risk of injury to person or to property, of one of 
the parties or of others, that is disproportionate to the ends to be attained by performance. 
However, "impracticability" means morethan "impracticality." A mere change in the 
degree of difficulty or expense due to such causes as increased wages, prices of raw 
materials, or costs of construction, unless well beyond the normal range, does not amount 
to impracticability since it is this sort of risk that a fixed-price contract is intended to 
cover. Furthermore, a party is expected to use reasonable efforts to surmount obstacles to 
performance (see § 205), and a performance is impracticable only if it is so in spite of 
such efforts. 
Illustrations: 
6. A contracts to repair B's grain elevator. While A is engaged in making repairs, a fire 
destroys the elevator without Afs fault, and A does not finish the repairs. A's duty to 
repair the elevator is discharged, and A is not liable to B for breach of contract. See 
Illustration 3 to § 263. 
7. A contracts with B to carry B's goods on his ship to a designated foreign port. A civil 
war then unexpectedly breaks out in that country and the rebels announce that they will 
try to sink all vessels bound for that port. A refuses to perform. Although A did not 
contract to sail on the vessel, the risk of injury to others is sufficient to make Afs 
performance impracticable. A's duty to carry the goods to the designated port is 
discharged, and A is not liable to B for breach of contract. Compare Illustration 5 to § 
262. 
8. The facts being otherwise as stated in Illustration 7, the rebels announce merely that 
they will confiscate all vessels found in the designated port. The goods can be bought and 
sold on markets throughout the world. A refuses to perform. Although there is no risk of 
injury to persons, the court may conclude that the risk of injury to property is 
disproportionate to the ends to be attained. A's duty to carry the goods to the designated 
port is then discharged, and A is not liable to B for breach of contract. If, however, B is a 
health organization and the goods are scarce medical supplies vital to the health of the 
population of the designated port, the court may conclude that the risk is not 
disproportionate to the ends to be attained and may reach a contrary decision. 
9. Several months after the nationalization of the Suez Canal, during the international 
crisis resulting from its seizure, A contracts to carry a cargo of B's wheat on A's ship 
from Galveston, Texas to Bandar Shapur, Iran for a flat rate. The contract does not 
specify the route, but the voyage would normally be through the Straits of Gibraltar and 
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the Suez Canal, a distance of 10,000 miles. A month later, and several days after the ship 
has left Galveston, the Suez Canal is closed by an outbreak of hostilities, so that the only 
route to Bandar Shapur is the longer 13,000 mile voyage around the Cape of Good Hope. 
A refuses to complete the voyage unless B pays additional compensation. A's duty to 
carry B's cargo is not discharged, and A is liable to B for breach of contract. 
10. The facts being otherwise as in Illustration 9, the Suez Canal is closed while A's ship 
is in the Canal, preventing the completion of the voyage. A's duty to carry B's cargo is 
discharged, and A is not liable to B for breach of contract. 
11. A contracts to construct and lease to B a gasoline service station. A valid zoning 
ordinance is subsequently enacted forbidding the construction of such a station but 
permitting variances in appropriate cases. A, in breach of his duty of good faith and fair 
dealing (§ 205), makes no effort to obtain a variance, although variances have been 
granted in similar cases, and fails to construct the station. A's performance has not been 
made impracticable. A's duty to construct is not discharged, and A is liable to B for 
breach of contract. 
e. "Subjective" and "objective" impracticability. It is sometimes said that the rule stated 
in this Section applies only when the performance itself is made impracticable, without 
regard to the particular party who is to perform. The difference has been described as that 
between "the thing cannot be done" and "I cannot do it," and the former has been 
characterized as "objective" and the latter as "subjective." This Section recognizes that if 
the performance remains practicable and it is merely beyond the party's capacity to render 
it, he is ordinarily not discharged, but it does not use the terms "objective" and 
"subjective" to express this. Instead, the rationale is that a party generally assumes the 
risk of his own inability to perform his duty. Even if a party contracts to render a 
performance that depends on some act by a third party, he is not ordinarily discharged 
because of a failure by that party because this is also a risk that is commonly understood 
to be on the obligor. See Comment c. But see Comment a to § 262. 
Illustrations: 
12. A, a milkman, and B, a dairy farmer, make a contract under which B is to sell and A 
to buy all of A's requirements of milk, but not less than 200 quarts a day, for one year. B 
may deliver milk from any source but expects to deliver milk from his own herd. B's herd 
is destroyed because of hoof and mouth disease and he fails to deliver any milk. B's duty 
to deliver milk is not discharged, and B is liable to A for breach of contract. See 
Illustration 1 to § 263; compare Illustration 7 to § 263. 
13. A contracts to sell and B to buy on credit 1,500,000 gallons of molasses "of the usual 
run from the C sugar refinery." C delivers molasses to others but fails to deliver any to A, 
and A fails to deliver any to B. A's duty to deliver molasses is not discharged, and A is 
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liable to B for breach of contract. If A has a contract with C, C may be liable to A for 
breach of contract. 
14. A, a general contractor, is bidding on a construction contract with B which gives B 
the right to disapprove the choice of subcontractors. A makes a contract with C, a 
subcontractor, under which, if B awards A the contract, A will obtain Bfs approval of C 
and C will do the excavation for A. A is awarded the contract by B, but B disapproves 
A's choice of C, and A has the excavation work done by another subcontractor. A's duty 
to have C do the excavation is not discharged, and A is liable to C for breach of contract. 
/ Alternative performances. A contract may permit a party to choose to perform in one 
of several different ways, any of which will discharge his duty. Where the duty is to 
render such an alternative performance, the fact that one or more of the alternatives has 
become impracticable will not discharge the party's duty to perform if at least one of 
them remains practicable. The form of the promise is not controlling, however, and not 
every promise that is expressed in alternative form gives rise to a duty to render an 
alternative performance. For example, a surety's undertaking that either the principal will 
perform or the surety will compensate the creditor does not ordinarily impose such a 
duty. See Restatement of Security § 117. Nor does a promise either to render a 
performance or pay liquidated damages impose such a duty. Furthermore, a duty that is 
originally one to render alternative performances ceases tobe such a duty if all but one 
means of performance have been foreclosed, as by the lapse of time or the occurrence of 
a condition including election by the obligor, or on the grounds of public policy (Chapter 
8) or unconscionability (§ 208). 
Illustrations: 
15. On June 1, A contracts to sell and B to buy whichever of three specified machines A 
chooses to deliver on October 1. Two of the machines are destroyed by fire on July 1, and 
A fails to deliver the third on October 1. A's duty to deliver a machine is not discharged, 
and A is liable to B for breach of contract. If all three machines had been destroyed, A's 
duty to deliver a machine would have been discharged, and A would not have been liable 
to B for breach of contract. See Uniform Commercial Code § 2-613. 
16. A contracts to repair B's building. The contract contains a valid provision requiring A 
to pay liquidated damages if he fails to make any of the repairs. S is surety for A's 
performance. Before A is able to begin, B's building is destroyed by fire. Neither A's nor 
S's duty is one to render an alternative performance. A's duty to repair the building is 
discharged, and A is not liable to B for liquidated damages or otherwise for breach of 
contract. S's duty as surety for A is also discharged, and S is not liable to B for breach of 
contract. 
A-6 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12 
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a 
defendant shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service of the summons and 
complaint is complete within the state and within thirty days after service of the summons 
and complaint is complete outside the state. A party served with a pleading stating a 
cross-claim shall serve an answer thereto within twenty days after the service. The 
plaintiff shall serve a reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after 
service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after 
service of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this 
rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the 
court, but a motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a pleading does not affect 
the time for responding to the remaining claims: 
(a)(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the 
merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after notice of the court's 
action; 
(a)(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive pleading 
shall be served within ten days after the service of the more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, 
whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the 
responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at 
the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject 
matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of 
process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of 
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No 
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or 
objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of 
such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse 
party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at the 
trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief If, on a motion asserting the 
defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by 
the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all 
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within such 
time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and 
not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and 
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disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity 
to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in subdivision (b) 
of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the motion for judgment 
mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and determined before trial on 
application of any party, unless the court orders that the hearings and determination 
thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is 
permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a 
responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement before interposing 
a responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the 
details desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten 
days after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court 
may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems 
just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if 
no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within 
twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court may order stricken from any 
pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 
scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may join with 
it the other motions herein provided for and then available. If a party makes a motion 
under this rule and does not include therein all defenses and objections then available 
which this rule permits to be raised by motion, the party shall not thereafter make a 
motion based on any of the defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in 
subdivision (h) of this rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either 
by motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable party, 
and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later 
pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on 
the merits, and except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or 
otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the 
action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in 
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after the denial 
of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action resides out 
of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a motion to require the 
A-8 
plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges which may be awarded against such 
plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court of the reasonable necessity 
therefor, the court shall order the plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient 
sureties as security for payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against 
such plaintiff. No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of 
the United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the undertaking as 
ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court shall, upon motion of the 
defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
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PART VII DISCHARGE AND IMPOSSIBILITY 
TOPIC B IMPOSSIBILITY 
CHAPTER 74 IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE- PERSONAL INABILITY 
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M.15 When a Promisor Assumes the Risk of Impossibility of Performance—General Framework for 
alysis 
o To Supp] 
>urts and commentators often expressly engage in risk analysis when analyzing impossibility cases. The duty 
II not be discharged if the party seeking discharge assumed the risk that the disabling event might occur, 
lis focuses the inquiry of the reviewing court but begs the question: What is meant by "assumption of risk" in 
is context? On what basis should a court say that one party, rather than the other, assumed the risk of 
janged circumstances? Generally speaking, risk assumption may be understood in several ways: by voluntary 
>sent to accept the risk in the contract itself; by tacit assent, e.g., by failing to protect against a known risk 
the contract; by implication, e.g., when custom in the trade or profession allocates it to one party or the 
:her; or by a rule of law based upon principals of equity, fairness, and other societal norms. Often, when a 
Durt says that a contractor "assumed the risk," we cannot tell whether the court means that the contractor 
xpressed such an intention or impliedly accepted it, or that the court has decided on other grounds that the 
romisor ought to carry the risk and bear the loss. In other words, a statement that one party "assumed the 
isk" means only that the court refused to discharge the duty. Without more, it does not explain why the duty 
/as not discharged. 
Usk analysis in the impossibility doctrine "ultimately represents the ever-shifting line, drawn by courts 
lopefully responsive to commercial practices and mores, at which the community's interest in having contracts 
enforced according to their terms is outweighed by the commercial senselessness of requiring performance."1 
Courts are hesitant to relieve contracting parties from their obligations, since contracts by their very nature are 
nade to lock in rights and protect against unknown circumstances the future may bring. In deciding who 
should bear the risk of post-contract events disrupting expectations, courts attempt to balance the sometimes 
competing policies of certainty in contractual relations and shared attitudes about fairness, equity, and 
proportionality. Like the common law in general, the impossibility doctrine is sufficiently flexible and adaptive 
to achieve just results dependent on the factual circumstances presented to the court. 
Cases holding that a promisor assumed the risk of certain types of impossibility, and that the promisor must 
pay damages in case of nonperformance, can sometimes be explained by process of reasonable contract 
interpretation. The promisor expressly or impliedly assumed the risk by having knowledge of the risk and eithei 
accepting it explicitly or failing to protect against it in the agreement.2 If A sells land to B and the latter 
promises that no building other than a house will be erected on the premises, is there a breach if a railroad 
company takes the land by eminent domain and builds a station there? Contract interpretation may show that 
B's undertaking was no more than a promise that B would not personally build or assent to the building of 
anything but a house, and that B would do all within B's power to prevent any different type of construction. 
On this interpretation, B has not breached the promise; and any loss must be borne by A.3 On the other hand 
if we interpret B's obligations to mean that B promised to indemnify A against a loss resulting from any 
building, regardless of its cause and even if it was unstoppable, B will be compelled to do so.4 
Seldom will reported cases involve contracts where the risk was explicitly allocated to a party. More often, the 
allocation can be found by looking at the entire contract and other circumstances affecting the agreement. In 
Gordon v. Indusco Management Corp.,5 Indusco purchased a franchise under a contract making time of the. 
--*. ..« A~.^hico nut-ipfq. Gordon contracted to erect a building in ninety days but dicK 
not perform as promised, claiming impossibility because it could not obtain building permits under the zoning 
category of the property. The agreement did not assign the obligation to obtain permits to either party, and 
was silent on the effect of permit denial or delay. The court nevertheless held that there was no excuse 
because Gordon knew of the zoning issue and permit requirements at the time of contracting, or would a t least 
be charged with such knowledge given his position in the industry, had represented to Indusco that there 
would be no problem obtaining permits, and had induced Indusco to enter a lease for the site without 
providing for any such contingencies in the agreement.6 Gordon therefore was deemed to have assumed the 
risk of this type of delay. 
Sometimes the primary purpose of one of the parties in creating the contractual relationship is to eliminate a 
particular risk of injury by obtaining a promise from another party to prevent that injury. If an irrigation 
company promises to supply water for irrigation or other use in an arid region, it may be held to anticipate 
natural shortages, even unusually severe ones, and to find the necessary water at the time and place where it 
exists.7 Even if the contract is silent on risk allocation, the promisor may fairly be said to have assumed the 
isk of its own inability to do what others might have done—ensure that adequate water supplies are available 
:o those who are paying for it. The contract can be viewed as a risk management agreement, not unlike an 
nsurance contract, whereby the land owner agrees to pay a premium in exchange for someone else taking the 
isk of severe water shortages. 
n other cases the same result may be reached even though the court is convinced that it never entered the 
ninds of the parties that there was a risk of impossibility. The court's action may be governed by the custom 
»f the relevant community in such cases. Do promisors generally indemnify promisees in such circumstances, or 
o promisees usually bear their own disappointment? There may have been reliance on the promise, a loss 
icurred, or an expected gain prevented. Someone must bear the loss, and the court may deem it more just, 
i light of accepted community standards, to make the promisor carry the risk and suffer the consequences. 
»ne such instance occurs when market conditions change or the financial circumstances of one of the parties 
nanges for the worse, rendering performance impossible. As stated in comment b to Restatement (Second) of 
ontracts § 261, "the continuation of existing market conditions and of the financial situation of the parties are 
-dinarily not such [basic] assumptions, so that mere market shifts or financial inability do not usually effect 
scharge ... ." Following this comment, illustration 2 gives the example of a contracting party who is unable to 
arform because his funds are on deposit in a bank that fails. According to the Restatement, the party 
;sumes such a risk and is not discharged. 
the contract does not allocate the risk, and if the relevant customs are variable and uncertain, then the 
ses become more difficult to decide and the court may find guidance in precedent. From an economic 
rspective, consistency of decision may reduce uncertainty and litigation, and enable well-informed 
ntractors to adjust their affairs in accordance with the risks to be carried. I t may make little difference to the 
mmunity at large which party bears the risk, but it is important that the contracting parties know in advance 
lich one will likely bear it, so they can order their affairs differently if they wish to deviate from the norm. At 
2 very least, adherence to precedent can allow disputing parties to predict the outcome of contemplated 
gation when changed circumstances lead to nonperformance. 
neral rules have developed in this area. Courts usually hold, for example, that a contracting party must 
•ry the risk when subsequent events cause a decline in the value of the land or goods for which the party 
•gained.8 If events have prevented the realization and enjoyment of expected values from a promised 
formance, or increased those values, those losses or gains generally fall where they may. In some cases, 
vever, it has been held that a contractor does not carry the risk of catastrophic collapse of value. It may be 
nd that the contractor did not assume the risk and that the circumstances are so extraordinary that fair 
ided people would conclude that the contractor should not be compelled to carry it.9 
Uniform Commercial Code makes no significant change in the general approach to risk analysis.10 Section 
15 states, in part, as follows: 
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation ... (a) Delay in delivery or non-
delivery in whole or in part by a seller who complies with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of 
his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has become impracticable by the 
occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the 
contract was made . . . . 
first clause refers to an assumption of the risk by the seller's taking on a greater obligation in the 
eement than the law would otherwise imply. The parties may allocate risks in the agreement. A different 
nent is introduced by the phrase "by the occurrence of a contingency the nonoccurrence of which was a 
ic assumption on which the contract was made," which relates to the assumption of certain risks but not 
ers after the contract is made.1 1 In essence, the introductory language relates to an assumption of risk by 
terms of the agreement or by implication based on the circumstances under which the agreement was 
de. The second provision relates to the allocation of the risk imposed by law in light of subsequently 
:urring events.12 As one court put it: "The latter part of the test seems a somewhat complicated way of 
t ing Professor Corbin's question of how much risk the promisor assumed."13 The Restatement (Second) 
;es a similar approach, except it makes explicit what the UCC leaves implicit: a promisor may not benefit 
m the doctrine of impossibility if the promisor is guilty of contributory fault.14 The subject of contributory 
lit is addressed in the next section of this treatise. 
e most frequently cited inquiry in deciding these cases is the foreseeability of the event that caused the 
ficulty.15 If the court concludes that the problem was or should have been anticipated by the party seeking 
scharge, the impossibility argument inevitably fails; if the event was wholly unforeseeable, the argument has 
much better chance of succeeding.16 In Dills v. Town of Enfield,17 for example, the duty of a developer under 
i option agreement for the sale of land was not discharged by supervening impracticability on the ground 
at the developer was unable to obtain mortgage financing. The court found that the failure to obtain 
lancing was a possibility that the developer foresaw, or should have anticipated, at the time the contract was 
rmed.1 8 
ne foreseeability of an event is not conclusive, however. Several authorities argue against placing heavy 
fiance on foreseeability as a means of allocating post-contract risks.19 An explanatory comment to the 
estatement (Second) states that foreseeability is only one of the factors to be considered in determining 
'hether the defense of impossibility is available.20 It also provides that the failure to deal with an improbable 
r insignificant contingency, even though foreseen, should not be deemed to amount to an assumption of the 
isk.21 One court reasoned that the promisor should be allowed to explain why there was no clause in the 
ontract covering the contingency, e.g., the other party might have been the dominant party and the promisor 
vas forced to sign a standard form contract.22 Under these circumstances, discharge could be granted even 
hough the risk was foreseeable and the agreement failed to address the issue. 
The more liberal view has been espoused by a few courts and some commentators.23 They contend that 
:oreseeability is of no importance when the parties did not intend that the risk of the occurrence should be 
assumed by the promisor. For example, in West Los Angeles Institute for Cancer Research v. Mayer,24 the 
defendant contracted to sell certain real property to the plaintiff, a tax-exempt charity, and to lease it back. 
The parties assumed that substantial tax benefits would accrue to defendant through this arrangement. I t was 
clear that the plaintiff knew that the defendant would not have entered into the transaction but for the 
prospective tax advantages. The IRS subsequently issued a revenue ruling disallowing the type of tax 
advantages that the parties expected. The defendant refused to perform and claimed the defense of 
frustration. The plaintiff argued that defendant could not use the defense because it was foreseeable that the 
IRS might disapprove the tax benefits. Notwithstanding the foreseeability, the court held that the defense was 
available because the parties intended that neither party should assume this risk. 
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